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This study  develops  a utility maximization, infinite horizon forest rotation model that 
includes in situ values and  the forest owner's consumption/savings  decision making. The 
value of forest land becomes  owner-specific  and depends  on property  rights  related to  in 
situ benefits. The  length  of  the rotation period  always  depends  on the initial stand age and 
the wealth of  the forest  owner.  Even if  the forest owner's  subjective  time preference  equals  
the rate  of  interest,  the  rotation  period  may evolve  in  time and it may  be optimal  to  give  up 
forest harvesting  in finite time. A forest owner  with accumulating  nonforest assets  never  
continues harvesting  forever. In contrast, a  forest owner  with decreasing  nonforest assets  
adjusts  the rotation period  toward the Faustmann solution. In a multiple stand version of the 
model, the harvesting  decisions regarding  different stands  are  linked together  via  the budget  
constraint and  the dependence  of  an individual stand's  in  situ  value on the age structure  of  
the whole forest. Numerical simulation with two  stands  suggests that within the  class of 
concave  in situ valuation functions the optimal  solution yields convergence toward forests 
with increasing  heterogenity  of age structures. 
Metsään liitetyt in situ  (ei-puuntuotannolliset)  arvostukset  tuottavat  monia puun tarjontaa,  
metsämaan  arvoa ja taloudellisia ohjauskeinoja  koskevia  avoimia kysymyksiä.  Lisäksi  
voidaan yleisemmin  kysyä miten in situ arvostukset  muuttavat taloudellisesti tehokkaan 
puuntuotannon ja esimerkiksi kiertoajan  määräytymisen  perusperiaatteita.  Näiden 
kysymysten  tarkastelemiseksi tarvitaan talousteoreettisesti perusteltu  ja  empiirisesti  validi 
metsänonomistajien  rationaaliseen käyttäytymiseen  perustuva mallikehikko. 
Taloudellinen yksityismetsänomistajien  puuntarjontatutkimus  sisältää kaksi  
erilaista tutkimustraditiota,  joihin metsän in situ arvostusten tutkimus voidaan perustaa.  
Nämä ovat Pohjoismaissa  kehitetty  kahden periodin  metsämalli ja Pohjois-Amerikkassa  
sovellettu Faustmannin rotaatiomalliin perustuva tutkimustraditio. Kahden periodin  mallin 
etuna  on  sen talousteoreettinen yleisyys. Mallin avulla voidaan esimerkiksi  tarkastella  miten 
epätäydelliset  pääomamarkkinat,  epävarmuus  ja  in situ arvostukset vaikuttavat puun 
tarjontaan. Ongelmana  on kuitenkin malliin sisältyvä kuvaus metsästä homogeenisena  
biomassana ilman ikäluokkia. Kahden periodin  mallit eivät  tämän seurauksena voi tuottaa  
esimerkiksi rotaatioperiodin  pituutta koskevia  tuloksia. Faustmannin malliin perustuvan 
tradition etuna on todellisuutta paremmin vastaava kuvaus tasaikäisiin puustoihin  
perustuvasta  metsänhoidosta. Ongelmana  on kuitenkin metsänomistajakohtaisten  tekijöiden  
jääminen  mallin ulkopuolelle  sellaisissakin  tapauksissa,  joissa  tämä ei ole  kahden periodin  
tradition tulosten nojalla mahdollista. Erityisesti  tämä ongelma  koskee  tapausta,  jossa  
tutkitaan in  situ arvostusten  vaikutusta  puun tarjontaan.  
Tässä tutkimuksessa yhdistetään  edellä mainittujen  traditioiden vahvuudet kehit  
tämällä yksityismetsänomistajan  päätöksentekoa  kuvaava hyödyn maksimointiin perustuva 
optimirotaatiomalli,  joka sisältää metsänomistajakohtaiset  tekijät  ja metsään liitetyt in situ 
arvostukset.  Metsänomistajalla oletetaan olevan altruistinen perinnönjättömotiivi,  pääoma  
markkinoiden oletetaan olevan täydelliset  ja in situ hyötyjen oletetaan riippuvan  puuston 
iästä  tai usean  puuston  tapauksessa  puustoista  koostuvan metsän ikäluokkarakenteesta. 
Tutkimuksen päätulokset ovat seuraavat: ainoastaan erikoistapauksessa  
optimikiertoajan  pituus  on vakio ja hakkuukertojen  määrä ääretön  kuten Faustmannin 
mallissa.  Varallisuuttaan kasvattavilla metsänomistajilla  kiertoaika ajan  kuluessa  pitenee  ja 
hakkuukertojen  määrä on aina äärellinen. Varallisuuttaan kuluttavilla metsänomistajilla  
kiertoaika lyhenee  ja lähestyy  Faustmannin kiertoaikaa. Kiertoajan pituus  riippuu  aina 
metsänomistajan  varallisuudesta, puuston iästä tarkasteluajan  alussa ja metsänomistajan  
subjektiivisista  arvoista  ja  arvostuksista.  In situ arvostukset  pidentävät  puuston kiertoaikaa,  
jos in situ arvo  kasvaa  puuston iän funktiona. Olettaen, että kiertoaika pysyy  suurimman 
mahdollisen fyysisen  puuvolyymin  tuottamaa kiertoaikaa lyhempänä,  in situ arvostukset 
lisäävät puun tarjontaa  ja alentavat puun markkinahintaa. 
Usean puuston mallissa tarkasteltiin tapausta, jossa kunkin puuston in situ 
merkitys on sidoksissa koko  metsän ikäluokkarakenteeseen. Numeerisen simuloinnin 
perusteella  in situ arvostusten seurauksena syntyy  taloudellinen kannustin lisätä metsän  
ikäluokkarakenteen heterogeenisuutta  eli metsää sopeutetaan alkuperäisestä ikäluokka  
rakenteesta hitaasti kohti normaalimetsää. Vastaavaa taloudellista kannustinta  ei synny  
ilman in situ  arvostuksia  olettaen, että pääomamarkkinat  ovat  täydelliset.  
Myös metsämaan markkina-arvon määräytyminen  eroaa oleellisesti klassisista  
Faustmannin tuloksista. Markkina-arvo riippuu  mm. metsänomistajan  varallisuudesta ja in 
situ hyötyihin liittyvistä omistusoikeuksista. Jokamiehenoikeuksien tapauksessa  
potentiaaliselle  ostajalle  syntyy  taloudellinen kannustin antaa liioiteltu kuva in situ 
tekijöiden  vaikutuksesta soveltamaansa metsänhoitoon. Metsänomistajan  avainbiotoopin  
säästämisestä (aidosti)  vaatima korvaus  riippuu  esimerkiksi  hänen tulotasostaan (vrt. uusi 
metsälaki)  ja metsänomistajalle  syntyy  kannustin vähätellä omia ei-puuntuotannollisia  
arvostuksiaan. Mallin perusteella voidaan esittää hypoteesi, jonka mukaan 
jokamiehenoikeuksien  tapauksessa  metsänomistajien  in situ arvostuksilla on pienempi  
alentava vaikutus metsän  puuntuotannolliseen  arvoon  kuin  yksityisomistuksen  tapauksessa.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent developments  in forest economics  and  timber supply  models have  lead to two  
distinct traditions. These are  the two-period or  Scandinavian tradition and the optimal  
rotation or  North American tradition (Amacher  1997). The former is  based on the Fisherian 
utility maximization consumption/savings  model augmented  by  a  biomass  harvesting  model. 
The optimal  rotation tradition is  based on the Faustmann  (1849)  profit  maximization model 
where harvesting  activity  is  related to stands with specific  ages. The two  period  tradition 
has been succesfull  in incorporating varying  factors  determining  timber supply,  such  as  
uncertainty in prices  and interest rates,  nontimber values, imperfect  capital  markets and  
forest taxation (Lohmander  1983, Johansson and Löfgren  1985, p. 268, Koskela 1989, 
Kuuluvainen 1990, Ovaskainen 1992, Ollikainen 1993, Amacher and Brazee 1997). A 
central feature in the two-period tradition is that forest  harvesting  decisions become 
dependent on forest  owner-specific  characteristics,  a hypothesis  that has  obtained clear  
empirical  support (Binkley  1981, Kuuluvainen and Salo 1991, Dennis 1990).  In  contrast, the 
tradition based  on the Faustmann rotation model continues to implicitly rely on  the 
Fisherian separation  theorem, even in models with nontimber values where this  
simplification  can be ruled out by  the  results of the two-period  tradition. However,  as a 
forest model the Faustmann specification  is  superior  since it is  based on stands with specific  
ages,  a  feature that is directly related to  coniferous trees  forest  management1 .  Thus there is  
a need to combine the strengths  of the two  traditions and formulate a utility-based  rotation 
model that is able to explain  the relationship  between forest owner characteristics and 
timber supply  in  terms of  the optimal  rotation period.  
We propose is a utility-based infinite horizon rotation model with nontimber 
•It  is shown by Binkley  (1987) that the "lumbed" parameter biomass approach  and the 
rotation model are  based on different biotechnologies  and lead to fundamentally  different 
optimality  conditions. See also Johansson and Löfgren  (1985)  p.  8  and  55.  
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values  and with the  forest owner's  consumption/savings  decision making.  The forest owner  
lives infinitely  or  has  an altruistic bequest  motive in the sense  that his bequest  function 
equals  the indirect utility function of  his heirs. Capital  markets are  perfect  and the owner  
obtains nonforest income. In situ benefits depend  on stand age. The resulting  nonindustrial 
private  forest owner's  optimal  forest harvesting  has  several  properties that surprisingly  differ 
from the  results  in both the two-period  and  optimal  rotation traditions. 
We show that if  the forest  owner's subjective  time preference  equals  the rate  of 
interest,  the  rate  of  consumption  is  constant  through  time and it may be optimal  to  apply  a 
constant  rotation period forever. In such a case  all  comparative  static  properties  of the 
rotation period  (and timber supply)  differ from  both the Faustmann (1849)  and Hartman 
(1976)  models. In addition, the value of forest land becomes  dependent  on  forest owner 
characteristics and the property  rights  related to  nontimber values  of forests.  The initial 
stand age determines the owner's wealth and hence  also  the length  of  the optimal  rotation 
period.  Similar dependence  is  ruled out in the Faustmann (1849)  and Hartman (1976)  
models. Simultaneously  with the Faustmann -type stationary  harvesting  program, there may 
exist  other optimality candidates with nonconstant  rotation period and finite number of 
rotations. With "high"  nontimber values,  such  a  solution may be  the global  optimum.  This is  
one implication  of  the fact  that with consumption/savings  dynamics the forest owner  may  
not  face a chain of identical harvesting  problems.  
A forest owner with increasing  consumption  and accumulating  financial assets 
always  applies  nonconstant  rotation and gives  up harvesting  in  finite time. By contrast, an 
owner  with decreasing  assets  shortens the  rotation through  time and rotation converges 
toward  the Faustmann solution. Recall that in contrast  the Faustmann (1849)  model and its 
one-stand (autonomous)  extensions yield constant rotation that is  repeated  forever. In a case 
with multiple  stands  we show that the harvests  of  different stands are  linked  together  both 
via  the budget  constraint and because  the in situ value  of any stand may depend  on the age  
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structure of the whole forest. We  demonstrate that  in situ valuation may yield a 
development  toward forests with increasing  heterogeneity  in year classes and toward 
harvesting  in smaller units. 
All  the above results  are  new.  Our  model differs from multiple  use  models like 
Hartman (1976) or Strang  (1983)  in the optimal rotation tradition since  we include the 
forest owner's  consumption/savings  decision making.  Because we consider the optimal 
rotation period, our  model differs from any model in the two-period  tradition based on a 
biomass description of forests. Our model and results  also differ from Hyberg  and 
Holthausen (1989) since  their formulation does not  fully  capture the  intertemporal  nature  of  
the problem  and is  restricted to  the single  stand case.  Tahvonen (1997)  develops  a  utility  
based  rotation model with consumption/savings  dynamics  and imperfect capital  markets,  but 
the in situ version  of  the model  considers a forest  owner  without a bequest  motive,  i.e. it is  
restricted to  the single  harvest  case.  Bowes and Krutilla (1985)  studies a multiple  stand 
model for public forestry  planning.  In contrast  to their model,  our  formulation describes a 
private  nonindustrial forest  owner,  including  his  consumption/savings  planning,  and shows 
how  the problem  can be solved by  nonlinear programming  instead of  Bellmann's dynamic  
programming.  
Section 2  specifies  the  problem  and  shows  how the optimal  control problem  with 
endogenous  stock  discontinuities can be  solved by  combining  a  simple  optimal  control and 
a nonlinear programming  problem.  Section 3 studies  the case  of  constant  consumption,  its  
comparative  statics  and the value of  forest  land. Section 4 considers evolving  consumption  
and non-stationary  rotation. Section 5  extends the model to the multiple stand case.  In 
section  6  we discuss  possible  future extensions. 
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2.  Even-aged  forest  harvesting  and optimal  consumption/savings  
decisions  
Problem specification  and notation 
We define a stand as a smallest harvestable unit of even-aged  trees. Without 
restrictions  on the smallest harvestable  unit, one may obtain outcomes  where a forest of any 
size  is  converted to  a normal forest. Physically,  the smallest harvestable unit is  one tree, but 
it  may be reasonable to assume that the stand consists  some larger number of trees since 
harvesting  trees  in very small units may lead to  high harvesting  unit costs. In addition, with 
coniferous trees, small stand size  reduces growth since stand size determines lighting  
conditions. In some parts  of Scandinavia this  has lead to legislation  that practically  rules  out  
stand size  so small as  to lead to  uneven-aged  management. 
The concept  of  an even-aged  stand  leads us  to  a  formulation that accords  with 
multiple use single  stand models like Hartman (1976)  and  others. In our multiple  stand  
version, the harvestable land area may consists  of any  number of stands of varying  ages. 
We first  develop analytical  results  for a  single  stand model and then generalize  it  to consist  
of  any  number of  stands.  
Assume that a forest owner has one even-aged  stand. The stand volume is 
denoted by  x  (m
3
), with x=F(x),  where Fis  a strictly  concave  growth  function  such  that 
F(0)=F(x)=0  and x>o.  Denote stumpage price  by  p and planting  costs by w. At harvesting  
moments, the owner  immediately plants  the next age class and thus  obtains net  forest 
income equal  to px(Sj)-w,  where x(sj)  denotes the harvesting volume for a  stand of age Sj.  
Subscript  i  refers  to  the number of  the harvest  and i=1,...,N,  N<~. The net  forest  income  is  
added to the owner's  financial assets, denoted by  a(t), where t is  calendar time. The owner 
receives  nonforest income m(t) and interest on his savings.  The rate  of interest is  p, the 
subjective  time preference  is 8. Capital markets are perfect.  Financial assets are 
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decreased by consumption  expenditures  c(t). Instantaneous utility from consumption  is  
given by  a  strictly  concave function U(c). In  addition, the stand of  age s gives the owner  
instantaneous in situ utility A(s). We assume  that A(s) is  nondecreasing  and concave,  not  
because this would be the only  empirically  plausible form but in order to obtain sound 
results for a  clearly  defined subclass  of possible  in situ valuation functions.
2 
In the Faustmann model,  infinite horizon reflects perfectly  functioning  land 
markets.  As will be shown, the inclusion of  in  situ preferences  complicates  the role of land 
markets.  We derive the optimal  forest rotation by  assuming  that the forest owner has a 
perfectly  altruistic bequest  motive. The bequest  function is  assumed  to  equal  the indirect 
utility function of the next  human generation  with identical preferences.  If all  generations  
have  the same preferences,  all financial assets and consumption  remains continuous when 
the bequest  is  realized. Such bequest  motives need  not  necessarily  be  considered explicitly.  
We obtain the same outcome by assuming  that the forest owner lives forever. The 
maximized utility for this solution then forms  the basis  for a possible  decision to  sell the 
forest  land. 
Denote the  volume of the stand just after planting  by  x O.  The forest owner then 
chooses  the consumption  schedule c(t)  and the cutting  moments  tj, i=1,...,N so  as to 
2Several papers assume  that nontimber benefits are  a  function of  stand volume. This may  be 
problematic  because not  all forestry  practices  that increase stand volume increase the  in situ 
value of forests. 
raaxW =  f  [U(c)+A(s)]e (1)  
{tj.c} J 0 
s.t. a=pa-c+m, when t*tj, (2) 
x=F(x), when t*tj, (3)  
a(ti )=a(ti -)+px(ti--ti_ l )-w, (4) 
x(tj)=x0 , (5) 
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where tp denotes the left hand limit for  tj.  Problem (l)-(8) includes two  time variables:  the 
calendar time t and the  age of the stand s.  The age of the stand equals  the  calendar time  
minus the date of  last  harvest,  i.e. s(t)=t-tj, where te(tj,ti+i],  to=o.  To simplify  the notation, 
the first  planting  is  assumed to  take  place  at the initial date to=o. In addition,  we write 
=oo  if  N<°°. At the  harvesting  moments tj,  stand volume jumps  to  zero  and  capital  assets  
jump  from a(tj
_
) to  a(tj-)+px(Sj)-w. This discontinuity  in states  complicates  the problem.  We 
present two different approaches  for developing  the necessary  optimality  conditions. 
Appendix  1 applies  the  maximum principle,  and here we develop  identical conditions using  
a  two  step  method that more intuitively  reveals  the structure  of  the problem. 
Partial separation  between forestry  and consumption  decisions  
Applying  conditions (2),  (4),  (6)  and (8)  we can write the forest owner's  budget  constraint 
as:  
Due to perfect  capital  markets,  the present values of future incomes determine the 
consumption  possibilities  but not their timing along  the  planning  horizon. Given any  
harvesting  program 5i,...,s , the forest 
owner's problem  is to use the budget  bo= 
r°°  -nt 
N
-nt  
ao+ e  
P
 mCOdt+.lj  [px(t,-t j_ 1 Isoas  to  
J
o
 
a(0)=ao, (6) 
x(0)=x0 , (7) 
lim a(t)>o, (8) 
t->OO  
r
o° N f
OO 
B=ao+l [px(t rti _i)-w]e~'
7
 '-I c(t)dt>o. (9) 
»00 
max U(c)e~  *dt, s.t. b=pb-c,  b(Q)=b o,  lim b(t)>o. (10)  
{  c}  J 0 t- 100 
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The solution problem  satisfies  X(t)=Aoe'- and  bo=|"e 
pt
c(t,Ao)dt,  where c(t,Ao)  is  
defined by  U'[c(t)]  =d(t). Using  this  solution we write the forest owners problem  as  
subject  to  (9),  where c=c(t,Ao).  This leads to  the  Lagrangian  L=W+pß  and to  the necessary  
conditions 
together with (9)  as an equality.  Note in (12)  that Equation  (13)  together  
with Ao given  by  the solution to  problem  (10)  form the basis  for studying  the optimal  
harvest decisions. 
It is  useful to first derive the Fisherian separation  result and the Faustmann 
formula as  special  cases.  Assuming  A(s)=o,  equation  (13)  simplifies  to 
Equation  (14)  links  consecutive rotation  periods  Sj  and  s i+i  together.  The solution for  (14)  is  
independent  of the marginal value of consumption,  implying  that the  optimal  harvesting  
program must  be  independent  of  forest  owner  characteristics  like  income and  preferences.  It 
f
OO -A N+l  rtj -A  
max W= U[c(t,Ao)]e dt+L A(t-tj_])e dt (11)  
{ A0,t,,...,t
N
} Jo
I=l
 J ti_!  
SL/dAo=  I™e~^U'(c)dc/i J  ™e~pt dc/<9Aodt=(Ao-jU)  J  ™e~P
l
dc/<9Aodt=o,  4  Ao=Ji, (12)  
dL/dt  j  |  M=^=A<je"
ptl |pF[x(s,)]  -pF[x(si+l )]  e~ps,+l -p  [px(Sj)-w]  J+  
e"
sti
jA(Si )-A(0)-Pi+lA'(s)dsJ=o, (13)  
pF  [x(sj)]  -pF  [x(si+l )]  e"
pSi+'  -p  [px(Sj)-w]  =O. (14)  
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is  also independent  of the subjective  time preference and calendar time. Thus,  we  can  
follow Faustmann (1849,  p. 442) or  Clark (1990,  p. 269)  and  conclude that all rotation 
periods  must have equal  length,  i.e. si=s i + 1 ,  i=1,.,.,°°. With equal  rotation length  (14), yields  
the Faustmann rotation. Another possibility  is to view equation (14)  as  a nonlinear,  first 
order, autonomous  ordinary  difference equation  written in implicit form. It has the 
Faustmann rotation Sj=sf for i=1,...,°°  as a stationary  solution. This solution is unstable 
because  dsi+l /dsi|  g_s  
=e^Sf>l.  Any  other  solution  with  N=°°  can  be  shown  to  violate  the  
second order necessary conditions. Thus the Faustmann solution must be the global  
optimum.  
We showed that without in situ preferences  our  model yields  the result that  forest 
harvesting  decisions are made independently  of consumptions/savings  decisions (c.f.  the 
Fisherian separation  theorem)  and that the stand is  harvested according  to the Faustmann 
solution.  The notion that an optimal  rotation program can be viewed as  a solution to a 
nonlinear difference equation  will turn  out  to be highly  useful when we  consider more 
complex  specifications.  
3.  Optimal  rotation  with  constant  consumption  
Stationary rotations 
The Faustmann solution was  obtained independently  of  whether <s=p. When the 
forest is  valued in situ,  the difference between the rate  of discount and the subjective  time 
preference  becomes essential. In this  section we study  the case  where s=p.  This implies  that 
the costate  for  capital  assets  is  constant, and we write  /t=Ao  a°d c=c o.  Given any  constant  A  
we can view equation  (13)  as  a first  order, autonomous  difference equation.  We first  study  a 
Faustmann -type stationary  optimality  candidate where the rotation length  is a finite 
constant; spsj  for  i=2,...,°°. By  partial  integration,  A(s 1 )-A(0)-J®
l
A'(s)e  
s
ds=A(S] )(l  -e 
S
 1 )-  
14  
S 5s  
sj s, A(s)e" 
s
ds. Using  this  and  dividing  (13)  by  (1-e ')  yields  the  cutting  equation  in the 
form 
The LHS  of (15)  equals the in situ benefits and  value growth  that  can be  obtained by  
marginally  postponing  the cutting  moment. The  RHS equals  the utility costs  due to  delaying  
the income from the next  cut  Ao<spx(S]),  plus  the monetary loss  due to delaying  the whole  
future harvesting  schedule, plus the loss  in delaying  the future stream of in situ benefits. 
Note that all terms are evaluated in utility units. The Faustmann formula follows as a 
special  case  of (15)  when A(s)=o and the Hartman (1976)  formula when A<>=l.  Equation  
(15) can be written in  the form 3 
In  the  Faustmann  solution  G^jpFfxCsOj-SpxCs^-SfpxCs^e'^'-wJ/O-e"^81 where  it  
must  hold that  dG/ds)  |q_q=pF[x(s l )] 
Such
 a  
maximum
 must  be  unique  
because the concavity  of  F  rules  out  the change  in sign  of dG/ds\  at points when G=o. 
Because  A(si)-sj S] A(s)e 
S
')>o  we obtain the result  that G<o and  that in situ  
o 
benefits lengthen  the rotation period.  
Assume that nonforest income m is  a constant.  From  the budget  constraint (9):  
3Compare  the Faustmann formula (4.4)  in Johansson and Löfgren  (1985,  p. 80). 
[x(sj )]  =Aospx(S]  )+<sAo  [px(s,)e"
&l
-w]  /( l-e"
&1
)+ 
5|
s
'A(s)e"
&
ds/(l-e"
&1
). (15)  
o  
r=Ao|pF[x(sl )]-spx(s l )-s[px(s l )e"
&1
-w]/(l-e"
&1
)  +  
A(s,  )-5  J
s  1  A(s)e~
&
ds/(  1  -e"
&  1  )=O. (16)  
o 
c
o=m+sao+s[px(si)-w]e 
Sl
). (17)  
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Thus consumption  equals  nonforest income plus  the interest  on  the initial  assets  and on  the 
(monetary)  value of  planted  forest  land. 
By  the uniqueness  of the Faustmann solution, G<o for se(s f,°°).  It also  remains 
bounded  from  below  and  G-*sw-6px(°°)  as  s-k*>.  The  term  A(si)-sj^'A(s)e"^
sdt/(l-e~^Sl)  
remains strictly  positive  for any  s€  [sf,°°).  Note from (17),  that dc()/da()=ö>o  implying  by  the 
strict  concavity  of U that (?A</r)ao<o.  Thus if we let ao  increase enough,  the  LHS  of (16)  
must  finally  obtain positive  values for any  finite rotation period.  This implies that with a()  
high enough  there cannot  be a stationary  rotation program satisfying  (16).  
To  study  the  other cases,  note  that  always  when  |imJT(si)=-A<)s[px(°°)-w]+A(°°)-  
C 
öJ°°A(s)e~  dt is  positive  there  is  one local  maximum with an infinitely  long  rotation 
0 
period.  This is  the case  e.g. when A(s)  is  linear. If there is  simultaneously  some finite 
locally  optimal  s t ,  the globally  optimal  solution is  the candidate with highest  W,  even 
allowing  for  the  possibility  that the  stand is  not  planted  at  all.  If  |imJT(si)  is  negative,  the 
globally  optimal  solution is  the finite horizon  candidate that yields  the highest  value for W. 
With general  functional forms,  it  seems  difficult to  rule out the multiple  interior optimality  
candidates. The global  optimum is  then the  candidate that yields the highest  W. The fact 
that in situ benefits lead to multiple local optima  holds even in the Hartman (1976)  model 
with  concave  A(s) (see  e.g. Strang  1983). 
Nonstationary  solutions 
We can study  the stability  of the stationary rotation as in the case of the Faustmann 
solution. For S=p we can study the stability  of (13)  by  keeping  Ao as  a constant.  
5s  
Differentiating  (13)  yields  dsi+l/dsi| +=e '>l,  implying  that the stationary  solution is  
I s i—si  1 
unstable in the sense that there cannot  be asymptotic  convergence toward it. In the 
Faustmann model and Hartman (1976)  it is always optimal  either not to harvest at all or  to  
harvest infinitely. This follows because after any harvest the optimization  problem is 
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repeated  identically. In our  model we cannot  rely  on this simple  argument because  even 
with  constant  consumption  it  is possible  that financial assets accumulate,  implying  that the 
forest owner's  situation need not  be the same after each  harvest. To study  whether it  may  be 
optimal  to apply  some  finite number of harvests,  consider Table 1. 
Table 1. Optimal  number of rotations 
Comparing  the no harvesting solution (N=o) and infinite stationary  rotations (N=°°)  yields  
the result that it is  preferable  to apply a rotation length  of 35.997 infinitely. However, 
computing  rotations for a finite number of  periods  yields  the result  that the present  value 
utility increases up  to  three rotations and decline thereafter. Thus the globally  optimal  
solution may not  be found by  comparing only  the stationary  infinite rotation program and 
the no harvesting  solution. 
With a  finite number  of rotations,  Ao  must  equal  the marginal  utility of  constant  
consumption  that corresponds  to the level of  accumulated financial assets after  the last  
harvest.  It is  clear that the  level of financial assets must be higher after the last harvest  than 
at t=o because otherwise applying the no harvesting  policy  from t=o would yield both 
higher  consumption  and higher  in situ benefits. Note that after the last harvest it is  
f°° -8s  
necessary  that 
N+J
)]-S[px(s
N+l
)-w]  }+A(sN+l )-J A'(s)e~  
ds>o as  sN+] (cf.  
equation  16). Otherwise stopping  the harvesting  cannot  be optimal.  This condition is  the 
N 0 
W, 8877.20 
si  
S2 
s
3 
5 4 
55 
1 2 3* 4 5 
9225.63 9279.46 9286.56 9286.06 9284.93 9283.35 
36.235 35.845 35.862 35.917 35.955 35.997 
36.000 35.871 35.906 35.946 » 
35.890 35.884 35.927 
35.838 35.890 
35.813 
Note:  A=As,  (U=c'~ a-l)/(l-a), x=K7(l-Ce
_rt
),  C=(x0-K)/x0 ,  A=\A,  
a=0.5,  p=  5=0.02,  K=500, r=0.15,  x0=10,  p=500,  w=2000, ao=105,  m=1000. 
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more likely  to hold the lower the value of  A<). The Faustmann rotation program yields  the 
lowest  attainable value for Xq.  Thus, if the above condition is  violated when Ao  corresponds  
to the Faustmann level,  it follows that the infinite stationary  rotation program is  the  globally 
optimal  solution. It is  easy  to develop  such  examples  (e.g. when A< 1.2 in the example  of 
Table 1). 
The numerical computation  of  rotation programs with any  finite N  can  be  carried  
out by  solving  
where  c(ti,...,tN
) is  defined by  (9)  as  an equality. This is  a nonlinear unconstrained 
optimization  problem.  The  global  optimum  is  found by  picking  the level of  N  that yields  the 
highest  value for W. 
The property of a  finite rotation program in combination with nonconstant  
rotation  differs sharply  from the previous  results  in  the multiple  use  literature. It is  one 
implication  of  the fact that with consumption/savings  dynamics  the forest owner may not  
face a chain of identical harvesting  problems.  These  properties become even more evident 
when we  consider cases  where &tp.  
Comparative  statics  for  the stationary rotation program 
We next study  how the stationary  rotation depends  on the model parameters.  Note from 
(11)  and (17)  that in the case of constant infinitely lasting  rotations the optimal  rotation 
problem can be formulated as  
N+l  rti 
maxW(ti,...,U=U[c(t l ,....,t )]/5f I (18)  
IN N i =1 Jti-1  
max  W(s!)=U[co(si)]  +  [  A(S])e 
s
ds/(l-e Sl ), 
{ s, } 
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where Cq(S])  is  defined by  (17). This  is  a  one -variable unconstrained optimization  problem.  
Carrying out  the differentiation, one obtains (16)  as the first  order  necessary  condition. Thus 
for  any  local interior  maximum it must  hold that dT/ds\<o  from equation  (16).  We obtain 
where <?Ao/<?Co<o and by (17) it  holds that t?co/<9m=l>o,  cfc(>/dao=(s>o,  
sx(S])e Sl)>0,  dco/dw=-5e dco/ds=e  
s
'[px(si)-w](l-&]-e  
(l-e"
&1
)2+ao|o.  
Nonforest income and initial nonforest assets lengthen  the rotation period.  Recall 
that these effects are totally absent from the Faustmann (1849)  and Hartman (1976)  
formulations. The effects of price and regeneration  costs are ambiguous  because there are 
both income and substitution effects. These results are  unambiguously  negative  and positive  
in  both the Faustmann and Hartman models (Bowes and Krutilla 1985). The Faustmann 
rotation  depends  only  on the relative values  of p  and w.  In  our  model, the absolute  values of 
p and w also  affect  the rotation period.  The effect  of the rate  of  interest/subjective  time 
preference  is  ambiguous,  as  in  the Hartman (1976)  model. 
In the Faustmann and Hartman (1976)  models, the initial stand age does not  
affect  the optimum  rotation period.  Above,  we have assumed that at t=o the forest owner  
has a newly  planted  forest land. It is possible  to consider any initial stand age, with the 
implication  that the older the initial stand the longer  the rotation period.  This follows 
4dS]/dm>o, (19)  
dr/dao=dÄo/daoG>o,  =>dS]/dao>o, (20)  
ar/sp=^V^pG+A{) {F[x(s l )]-5x(s 1 )-6x(s 1)e"
&1
/(l-e"
5si
)}|0,4ds!/dp|0 (21)  
1  -e"&1  )=O,  4dSl /dw=o (22)  
dTldfedTdddG+lo  dG!d5-d\A(s)e~
&
ds/(  1  -e
Bs  1 )  /ds=o,  =>ds,/d<s=o, (23)  
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Figure  1. Comparative statics  
Note:  A(s)=A(l-e"
ks
),  U(c)=(c'"
a
-l)/(l-a),  x(s)=K/(  1 -Ce  "),  C=(x
0
-K)/x
0
,  A=3s,  k=o.ol,  
x
o
=lo,  K=soo, r=0.048, p=l7o,  w=2ooo,  m=looo, 6=p=0.03,  a
Q
=lOOO,  a=l/2,  A=so,  
if  not stated otherwise. 
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because with older initial stand the forest owner has more valuable total assets and more 
financial resources  to  extend the rotation and benefit from the value of the stand in situ.  
Figure  1 shows  numerical examples  for the stationary  rotation period.  In Fig. la 
the in situ valuation increases the rotation length  from the Faustmann solution (~66) and  the 
rotation  length  finally  becomes infinitely  long. Fig.  lb shows  that the annual average  timber 
supply  increases with increasing in situ  valuation until the maximum sustainable yield 
(~3.8m 3)  is  reached. Fig.  lc  demonstrates that with in situ  valuation the  rotation period  may 
become  more sensitive  to price  changes  as  compared  to the Faustmann solution. Fig. Id 
shows  the  dependence  of optimal  rotation on nonforest income. Fig.  le shows a case where  
an increase in  the rate  of interest/subjective  time preference  decreases both rotation periods.  
Fig.  If shows  the backward bending  supply  curves.  In situ valuation shifts these curves  to  
the right  implying  that a  marginal  increase in in situ  valuation increases timber  supply  and  
decreases price,  given that the rotation period  is shorter  than the maximum sustainable yield 
rotation and vice versa.  
Value of  forest  land 
One main aim in the famous Faustmann (1849)  paper  was to obtain a method for 
calculating  the  value of forest  land4 .  In his model the value just  after regeneration  equals  
[px(s f)-w]e~ 
f/(l-e~ 
f
)> and the  value is  independent  of  forest owner characteristics. This 
does not  hold when forests  are  valued in situ. We study  the value of forest land in the case 
of infinite stationary  rotations. Assume first  a  private  property  regime  in which the forest 
owner  obtains in situ value from the forest only  if it is  in  his  possession.  In this  case  the 
forest owner  is  ready  to  sell the forest land if the price  offer  exceeds  Vj defined by  
4"The practical  importance  of  this  calculation is  easy  to  see.  From it  we  obtain the necessary  
information on the forest value in such cases  as voluntary  and enforced sales,  destruction of 
the forest  by  fire,  insects,  man,  etc.,  and assesment  of the most  advantagenous  system  and 
length  of rotations." (Faustmann  1849, p. 442) 
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where Co is  given by (17). Note  that without the forest land the present value maximized 
utility equals  U(sao+m)/5. Obviously  Vj  must  exceed the present  monetary value of the 
rotation program of the  original  owner,  but  it must  also  exceed  the Faustmann value of  the 
forest land. Differentiation shows s that  V!  is  higher  the higher  the timber price,  in situ 
valuation, nonforest income and nonforest assets and the lower the regeneration  costs. The 
effect of the  rate of interest or  subjective  time preference  is  ambiguous.  Among  other things  
this  shows  that buyers  with higher  nonforest income  or  nonforest assets,  ceteris  paribus,  are  
willing to buy  forest stands from less  wealthy  owners.  This  follows because with high 
nonforest income the marginal utility from consumption  is  low. 
Assume next  that  the stand in situ is  a common property resource  (c.f. the Right  
of  Common Access  applied  in  Scandinavia)  In this case  the forest owner will sell his forest  
land if  the  offer exceeds  V  2 as  defined by  
where s is  the expected  rotation of the new  owner of the forest land. When the  in situ value 
of the forest is  a  common property  resource  it  is  natural  to  assume  that any  potential  buyer  
obtains in  situ utility  even before a transaction. If s<s ]; the seller requires that V  2  exceed 
the monetary value of  the rotation related to  S],  Otherwise he would be worse  off.  However,  
V  2  must  also exceed the monetary value related to rotation s because the seller could have 
applied  s  but chose instead sj  as  the global maximum. Thus if s<s ); it is  necessary  that V  2  
exceeds  the monetary value related to s for  a transaction to be beneficial to  the seller. 
sUse  the envelope  theorem and  the fact  that U'(co)>U'(<sao+SV|+m). 
U(c0 )/S+-  
Sl
A(s)e"
&
ds/(l-e"
&1
)-U[5(a() +V l )+m]/s=o, (24)  
J
o 
U(c 0)/5+-j®
1A(s)e"
&1
/(l-e"
&1
)-{U[6(ao+V2)+m)]/5fI5A(s)e"
&
ds/(l-e"
5
-)}=o, (25)  
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However,  given  that the buyer's  in situ  valuation function is  increasing  with rotation length,  
a  transaction where V 2  exceeds  the monetary value related to s and s<Sj  cannot  be 
beneficial for the  buyer  because he will be worse  off both in monetary terms and in  situ 
utility.  It is  thus necessary that the buyer  is  planning  to  apply at least as  long  a rotation 
period  as the present owner, up until a transaction is  carried out. When s>sj  the seller's in 
situ benefits increase,  implying  that V  2  is  lower than the monetary benefits related to  Sj. 
Differentiation of  (30) shows
6 that  now V  2 is  the lower,  the  higher  the  values of  m and  ao  
for the present  owner  and the higher  his  in situ  valuation. The effects  of  p  and the rate  of  
discount are  ambiguous.  It is  also  clear that  in  the common property  regime  a potential  
buyer  has an incentive to give  the impression  that he will apply  a longer  rotation than what 
he is  actually  planning.  
In the new Finnish forest law, forest owners  are compensated  if they  apply  
extended rotations  to preserve the most valuable parts  of their forests.  We  study  how  much 
the owner must be compensated  until he is ready  to  totally give  up forest harvesting. Such 
compensation  must exceed V  3  defined  by  
Differentiation shows that V  3  is the higher,  the less  wealthy  the forest owner, the lower his 
in situ valuation and the higher the timber price.  In this case the forest owner has an 
incentive to inform the officials of shorter rotations than those consistent with his real 
preferences.  
6 Again  using  the  envelope  theorem and the fact  that U'(co)<U'(öao+m+ÖV 2). 
U(c0 )/<5+  [
Sl
A(s)e"
&
ds/(l-e"
&1
)-U(&o+m+5V3)/ö-  f  A(s)e~&ds=o. (26)  
o o 
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4.  Nonstationary  rotations  and evolving  consumption  
We next  study  the case  where &tp.  Recall that the optimal  harvesting  program 
must satisfy  equation  (13): 
Define D=pF[x(si )]-p[px(s i)-w]-pF[x(s i+l)]e"^
s,+l .  Note that  D is  bounded. 
When &£p  the rotation period  cannot  equal  any finite constant because with constant  Sj,  D 
and  A(Sj)-A(0)-  |^1+1 A'(s)e 
s
ds  are  constant  while increases  or  decreases.  Thus  
the rotation  period  always  evolves  in  time when dtp.  
Let us first study  the case where S-p<o. Now decreases and 
consumption  increases in time,  i.e. our forest owner saves  more than consumes.  Assume it 
is optimal  to continue the rotation infinitely. Because as t-»°, A(s;)-A(0)- 
JSi+l A'(s)e 
S
ds must  also approach  zero  as  t-»°.  Because  A(Sj)-A(0)-lS|+l  A'(s)e  
s
ds>o with 
o 0 
any Sj=Sj+i, either Sj+i>Sj for all large  enough  i and s,-*»  as i-*» or  Sj-O  as  i-»°. It cannot  be 
optimal to have Sj-0 because the net harvesting  income px(Sj)-w becomes negative.  
rs -5s  
Concavity of A(s) implies that J 'A'(s)e ds remains bounded. Therefore 
f  S* _gs 
A(s,)-A(0)- J 
l+l  A'(s)e ds>o when Sj  is  large enough.  This contradiction implies  that when 
s<p  it cannot  be optimal  to  continue the forest harvesting  forever. 
Figure  2  shows  an example  of such  a  solution. It  is  computed  backwards  from the  
date of last  harvest, The  level of  financial assets  a(t
N
) is  set  at  a  level implying that  
when  looking  forward  it  is  optimal  to  leave  the  stand  uncut.  a(t
N
)  determines Aoe^p^tN,  
which makes it possible  to compute the rotation periods  backwards  using  equation  (13). 
Consider the case  where <5-p>o.  Now increases without bound. If it is  
optimal  to once give up harvesting,  equation  (13)  must obtain positive  values when Sj+ i=°° 
Aoe
(<5"p)ti
 jpF  [x(Sj)]  -p  [px(Sj)-w]  -pF  [x(s i+l )]  e"pSi+'  J+A(Sj)-A(0)-J®'+1  A'(s)e"
&
ds=o.  (13)  
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and  Sj-to°.  The  concavity  of  A(s)  implies  that  the  term  A(Sj)-A(0)-J^ l+l A'(s)e" cannot  
increase  faster  than  linearly  while D  approaches  -p  [px(°°)-w]  <0  as  Sj-w.  Thus  Aoe
(5" P)t
'D<o  
and it decreases exponentially  without bound, implying  that equation  (13)  gets negative 
values and that it cannot be optimal  to give  up harvesting.  The rotation period  cannot  
increase forever by  a similar  argument.  If the rotation period  converges  toward some level 
other than the Faustmann rotation where  D=o the term l|D increases or  decreases 
exponentially  while A(Sj)-  A(0)-I
s
' +1  A'(s)e  
s
ds  converges toward a  constant, implying  a  
Figure  2.  Optimal development  of  the  rotation  period  when  s<p.  
Note:  A(s)=j4(l-e"
ks
),  U(c)=(c'  °-l)/(l-a),  x(s)=K/(l-Ce
ts
),  C=(x 0-K)/x 0 ,  A=3s,  k=o.ol,  xo=lo,  
K=soo,  r=0.048,  p=l7o,  w=2ooo,  m=looo,  5=0.02,  p=0.03,  a=l/2,  a(t
N
)=  1.13179  10
6
 
contradiction. Thus the rotation period  must  converge to  the Faustmann rotation. Figure  3 
shows  a numerical example  for the case  where B>p.  It is  computed  backwards  by  starting 
with a rotation period  close to  the  Faustmann solution (Sf=Bl).  However, the length  of the 
first  period  is  much  longer  and equals  117 years. 
The Faustmann model and its one stand extensions usually  have a constant  
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rotation period that is  repeated  forever. This is  especially  the case  with the Hartman (1976)  
model and its extensions like  Hyberg  and Holthausen (1989). 7 We have shown that the 
rotation period  need not  be constant  and forest harvesting  may not  continue forever. Thus 
including  consumption/savings  decision making  in the optimal rotation model with in situ 
preferences  alters  some of  the the most  basic  features of  optimal  forest rotation. Note also  
that these results  cannot be obtained within the two  period  forest modeling  tradition. 
Figure  3. Optimal  development  of  the rotation period  when S>p.  
Note:  A(s)=A(l-e"
ks
),  U(c)=(c'"
a
-l)/(l-a), x(s)=K/(l-Ce
rs
),  C=(K-x
0
)/x
0,
 A=lo,  k=o.ol,  
K=soo,  r=0.048,  xo=lo, p=l7o,  w=2ooo,  8=0.03,  p=0.02.  
7An exception  is the  model by  Löfgren  (1985),  where the rotation period  evolves  in time 
because of exogenous biotechnical change.  
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5.  Multiple  stands  
Assume  that  a  forest  consists  of m  stands  planted  at  dates t™<t™~
1
 <,...,<tö<o.  To  simplify  the 
notation we assume  that to=o,  i.e. that the youngest stand is  planted  at the beginning  of  the 
lr 
optimization  period. The initial age distribution of  the stands  can  thus be written as  -to,  
k=1,...,m. The in situ value of the forest  is given  by  a concave  symmetric  function 
A(5',...,sm),  where we assume  that cfiAJds'dssiO  for i*j and AeC
2 .  Thus the in situ  value of  
any stand depends  on the age distribution of the  whole forest,  but all stands make a 
perfectly  symmetrical  contribution to  the forest's  in situ  value. A more general  model where  
stands are  location-specific  and may have unique  in situ value and growth  functions is  
possible  to  formulate but complicates  the notation. 
k k k 
We denote the  harvesting  dates for  stand k  by tj,  t2 ,  
where  the final  harvest  
k 
occurs  at date <°°. When the number of harvests  is  finite, the infinite time interval after  
k kk-1 k -1 
is  denoted by  
kkk  1 k 1 
k k k 
is  s
k (t)=t-t., given  that te [t.,  t. +l )  
and its age at the ith harvesting  moment  is  
k kk kk  
s.=s  (t.)=t.-t. j.  
Given any harvesting  program, the present  value of  in situ  utility  equals  
V=|°°e  " t^A[s
l
(t),...,s
m
(t)]dt.  At any  cutting  moment, the  in situ  flow changes  
discontinuously.  For  differentiating V, we express  it as  a sum over  time periods,  where  
A[s'(t),...,s
m
(t)]  is  continuous. Thus  we  write 
where  we  denote t
m+l
=t.  
j
 in  the  cases  of  the  initially  oldest  stand m. Note  that  (27)  does 
not  give  the  time intervals in calendar order,  which does  not  however change  the value of  
V. The budget  constraint takes the form 
r
OO Xt t m N); o. 
V= e  A[s  (t),...,s
m
(t)]dt=
k
|
]  .gj +l e A(s  ~.., (27)  
J
o
Jt
j 
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Applying similar steps to those in  the single  stand case,  we obtain the Lagrangian  
l
U(c)dt+V+juß,  which yields  jii=Ao and  the following  equation  for  any  cutting  
moment  t
k:  
i  
where we denote t™
+J
=tj  .  Without in situ  valuation, i.e.  with A=o,  we  obtain the  
Faustmann formula [cf. equation  (14)], implying  that the stands are  cut  independently  of 
each  other and of  the forest owner's  characteristics. Thus,  in this case  the initial age 
distribution of the forest  is  repeated  in cycles,  with a length  equal  to the rotation period  
common to all stands. In contrast,  the in situ valuation breaks the separation  between 
harvesting  and  consumption  as  well as the separation  between different stands. The stands 
are not  cut separately  because harvesting any stand having  in situ value has an impact  on 
the forest owner's budget  and thus on the cutting  decision of any other stand with in situ 
value. In addition, the dependence  of the in  situ valuation of any stand on the age 
distribution of the whole forest forms another  link  between the harvesting  decisions. We can 
also observe  from (28)  that any individual stand without in situ  value,  i.e. with dA/ds
k
=o,  is  
harvested independently  of other stands according  to the Faustmann rotation but has an 
effect on the rotation ages  of stands with in situ value thought  the budget  constraint. 
r
°° m Nk , , t
k 
B=ao+  e"
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We can view equation  (28)  as  an ordinary  nonlinear difference equation.  When 
s=p,  its  order depends  on the number of stands  and is  equal  to 2m- 1. With one  stand 
(section  3),  the  rotation  period  in the stationary solution depends  on the initial age of  the 
stand but the rotation period  is  constant.  Assume  a case  of  two  stands with equal  initial 
ages. A rotation program that  maintains the equality  of  stand ages  leads to highly  uneven 
time distribution of marginal  in situ benefits. It is  thus possible  to  increase  the present  value 
of in  situ benefits  by  yielding  a deviation in  the stand ages.  The costs of this deviation in 
the form of reduced forestry income can be made arbitrarily small if the deviation is 
produced  slowly  during  several  rotations. This suggests  that with multiple  stands  there may 
be convergence toward some heterogeneous  steady  state age distribution. To take an 
example, assume  s=p  and  consider a  forest  of two  stands,  in which case  the equation  (28)  
for stand 1  takes the  form: 
Using  equation  (29)  we can compute examples  by proceeding backwards from a point  
arbitrarily close tp a steady  state rotation program consistent with a given  Aq.  Along  a 
steady  state, both stands have equal  rotation period  and the period  between cuttings  equals  
half the rotation length  (such  a solution satisfies (29)). After computing  the solution 
backwards,  we  can  formulate ad  hoc  consumption  preferences  and initial asset level that are  
consistent with the  given  Ao  and  the budget  constraint
B .  
B
Solving  the rotation program (forward) for a given  initial stand age distribution and 
nonforest  assets  requires  a  shooting  algoritm.  
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An example  of  a  rotation program converging  toward an steady  state  is  depicted 
in Figure  4. At t=o the age distribution is [0,1.6]  years. The first  rotation period  for the 
older stand  is  74  years  and  for  the younger 91  years.  After 9  rotations the harvesting  periods  
are  very  near  the steady  state  rotation period  (~  83 years).  Thus in  the steady  state  there is  a  
harvest after each  41.5 years. The example  in Figure  4 suggests a hypothesis  that within a 
class of concave  and increasing  in situ valuation functions there occurs  a convergence 
toward a  forest with increasing  heterogeneity  in stand ages. 
The example  in Figure  5  presents  another demonstration of how in situ valuation 
may  change  the structure  of forest year classes.  Without in  situ  valuation, the optimal  
Figure  4.  Optimal  development  of a  forest with two  stands. 
Note: A(s
1
,s
2
)=A(a+s,)"
k
(a+s
2
)"
k
,
 U(c)=(c'"a-l)/(l-a),  x,(s)=K/(  1 -Ce  
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),  C=(x
0
-K)/x
0,
 
A=l0
4
,
 a=0.02,  k=o.s,  p=0.03,  5=0.03,  p=l7o,  w=2ooo,  r=0.048,  K=soo,  x
Q
=lO,  a=l/2. 
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rotation  period is  66 years and independent  on whether a  forest  consisting  two  stands of the 
same  age is  viewed as  a one-stand or  two-stand  system.  We next  compute the steady  state  
rotation periods  for the one-stand and the two-stand forest as  functions of the in situ 
valuation parameter. For  the two-stand case,  it is  assumed that the initial  stand ages  equal  
the  steady  state pattern.  Increasing  the in situ valuation parameter above 500 implies  that 
when the forest is  taken as  one unit the steady  state  solution does not  exist  and it is  optimal  
to give  up forest harvesting  immediately  or in finite time. However, taking the two stands 
as  individual units implies  that there exists  at least  a locally  optimal  steady  state solution 
for the two-stand system  even with much higher in situ valuation. This suggests that the 
results  of one-stand multiple use models are  not  directly  applicable  at the forest  level. We 
can also hypothetize  that  a lower bound (e.g.  legal) restriction to stand size may decrease 
timber supply  because forest owners  may leave their forests  totally  unharvested because 
harvesting  may be  carried out  only  if the stand size is  smaller ceteris paribus.  
Figure  5.  Harvesting  a  forest  as  one  stand or  as  two  stands.  
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a=o.l,  k=l/2, m=looo,ao=looo,  p=l7o,  r=0.048,  a=l/2; with  one  stand  xQ=lO,  
K=soo,  w=2ooo, and  with two  stands xQ=5,  K=2so,  w=looo. 
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6.  Conclusions  
The literature on nonindustrial private forest owners consists of two distinct 
traditions: the two-period  utility maximizing tradition and the rotation period,  profit 
maximizing  tradition. The  two-period  tradition has shown that in cases  of uncertainty,  
imperfect capital  markets or  in situ  benefits the Fisherian separation  theorem does not  hold, 
implying  that forest management decisions depend on forest owner-specific  factors.  This 
dependence  then fundamentally  changes  the properties  of timber  supply  and e.g. results  in 
forest taxation. However,  this  problem  is  not  taken into  account  in  the optimal  rotation 
tradition. Our results show that a utility-based  rotation model with  in situ  benefits and 
consumption/savings  dynamics  alters  the most  basic  properties  of  optimal  forest rotation. 
Among  other things,  the rotation period  depends on the initial stand age. Even in the single 
stand case without any exogenous time dependent  factors,  the rotation period  may not be 
constant  and forest harvesting  may not  continue infinitely. The determination of the  value 
of forest land differs from the results  of Faustmann (1849)  and becomes dependent  e.g. on 
the property right  regime  related to  the in situ  benefits. Obviously  the rotation model with 
the forest owners  consumption/savings  decision making  should also be extended to  cover 
e.g. price  uncertainty.  
Appendix  1. 
The problem  (l)-(8) can be given  in the following  equivalent  form: 
W]=max  f [U(c)+A(s)]e  
t
dt+W
2 [a(tr)+px(si)-w,t l ] (AI)  
{  tj,c} Jo 
s.t. a=pa-c+m,  a(0)=ao, (A  2) 
x=F(x),  x(0)=x0 , (A  3) 
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where W2 is  the value function for the  period  te  [ti,°°)  problem  with a(t l )=a(tl~)+px(si)-w  as  
the initial nonforest assets. Let A,  <p  and  iff  denote the costates  for nonforest assets  a,  the 
stand volume x  and  the  age of the stand s  respectively.  By  Seierstad and Sydsaeter  (1987,  p.  
182 theorem 3,  note  2)  the Hamiltonian and the necessary  conditions for the optimal  
solution are: 
To develop  conditions (AIO), (All) and (A  13) we can apply  theorem 9 in Seierstad and  
rfSt  
Sydsaster  (1987,  p. 213).  We obtain e 1 <5W2/<9a(t|—)=A.(tj )  and, by  equation (A  10), that 
A(ti~)=A(ti),  i.e. A (and c)  must  be continuous. Because  a(t)-)+px(si)-w  is  the level  of  
5t  
nonforest assets at tj, e 
1
5W 2/^x(s i)=P^(ti) and equation  (All) yields (jp(t 1-)=pA(t 1). 
Equation  (Al3)  yields  H(ti-)=H(t]), which implies,  after canceling  the terms that remain 
continuous at t x ,  that A(s l )+pA(tl )F[x(t l-)]=A(o)+A(t l )p[px(t l -)-w]  + <p(t 1 )F(x o)+v<t 1). To 
proceed  we must  develop  the term <p(ti)F(x0 ). Equations  dx/dt=F(x)  and  d(p/dt=(p[s-F'(x)]  
imply  that d<p/dx=<p[s-F'(x)]/F(x),  which is  a  differential equation  in x:  
s=l, s(0)=0, (A  4) 
H=U(c)+A(s)+A(pa-c+m)+<pF(x)+i//, (A  5)  
U'(c)-Ä=o, (A  6)  
A=A(6-p), (A  7)  
<p=(jD[<s-F(x)], (A  8)  
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Thus (p(t)=<p(t 1 )e^
t" implying  <p(t,)F(xo)=<p(t2)e~^2F[x(s2)].  More  
generally,  we obtain,  for  any  i=1,...,°°,  that  (p(tj)F(xo)=pAoe^'
7 "'tl
+ IF[x(Si
+
i)]e~^tl+  
Next  by  y/(tj)=.P l+l A'(s)e"^
S
ds  equation  H(tj-)=H(tj)  simplifies  to:  
which is  identical to equation (13).  
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